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Deviation Among Technology Reviews: An Informative 
Enrichment of Technology Evolution Theory for Marketing  
Abstract 
Understanding technological change is of critical importance to marketers, as it bears 
new markets, new brands, new customers, and new market leaders. This paper examines the 
deviation among reviews of a technology‟s performance and its consequences for inferences on 
technology evolution patterns. The basic premise of the current paper is that technology 
evolution literature, while highly relevant, is misguided in that it ignores potential deviation 
among technology reviews. Using a comprehensive dataset of all published reviews, both before 
and after FDA approval, of 7 statins for cholesterol reduction (LDL) from 1982 to 2007, the 
authors find that: (1) there exists vast deviation among reviews of technology performance 
leading to systematic bias in the portrayal of the path of technology evolution, especially if one 
relies only on manufacturer‟s claims, (2) such deviation does not fade over time, (3) technology 
review (study design) characteristics affect the stated performance and, (4) both higher 
technology performance and a higher deviation affect sales positively, also when one controls for 
a firm‟s marketing expenditures. We discuss the implications of these findings for technology 
evolution theory, managerial practice and public policy. 
 
Keywords: Technology Evolution; Reviews; Performance; Statins; Sales; Detailing; 
Marketing; Innovation. 
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Introduction 
Understanding technological change is of critical importance to marketers, as it bears 
new markets, new brands, new customers, and new market leaders (Chandy and Tellis 1998; 
Hauser, Tellis and Griffin 2006; Kerin, Varadarajan, and Peterson 1992). Technology evolution 
scholars map the performance of a technology over time and make theoretical and practical 
inference based on such maps (for examples, see Christensen 1997; Foster 1986; Sood and Tellis 
2005).  
The basic premise of the current paper is that technology evolution literature, while 
highly relevant, is misguided in that it ignores potential deviation among reviews of technology 
performance. Technology evolution scholars incorporate only a single source of information, 
usually from the manufacturer, that makes a single statement on the maximum performance of a 
technology within each time period (Christensen 1997; Dosi 1982; Edwards 2008; Foster 1986; 
Moore 1997; Sahal 1981; Sood and Tellis 2005; Tushman and Nelson 1990; Utterback 1994). 
On the basis of that single source, such researchers make inferences on the typical pattern of 
technology evolution and analyze competition among technologies. They may also make claims 
on why certain technologies (e.g. digital camera) overtook entrenched incumbent technologies 
(e.g. analog camera) in sales. 
However, on many occasions, multiple reviews of the same technology may exist, with 
different conclusions on the performance of the technology. For instance, consumer reports 
would generally disagree with manufacturer claims on battery life of laptops or car mileage. 
Well-known technology writers, such as Walter Mossberg of the Wall Street Journal or David 
Pogue of the New York Times, may share different experiences with consumers even on the 
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same technology. Also the context in which technologies are tested may affect their 
performance. For instance, gas mileage depends upon driving speed, fuel composition, etc. In the 
pharmaceutical industry, manufacturers, competitors, and independent organizations produce 
reviews with different study designs and have different incentives in their reporting of 
performance.  
In this paper, we explore the extent to which deviation among technology reviews exists 
and whether it fades over time, as one would expect technology reviewers to learn over time. We 
also explore whether deviation affects the sales of different technologies and whether we can 
explain the origin of deviation among reviews.  
Gathering complete information on all reviews of a technology requires immersing 
oneself in a specific application area. For this study, we investigate different statin technologies 
and gather all reviews published in top medical journals by both manufacturers and independent 
researchers, and both prior to and after FDA approval. We also collect data on the design of such 
reviews including the number and profile of the patients involved and the dosage of the drug 
administered in the review. We connect this data on technology performance with data on sales 
and detailing expenses of manufacturers.  
While we cannot claim generalizability of our findings – we believe the extent of 
deviation and its causes and consequences are highly context-specific – they clearly caution 
against consistently ignoring deviation among technology reviews, which is current practice in 
the technology evolution literature. We show that large deviations exist among reviews on their 
efficacy (LDL reduction), even within a single time period, for all the statin technologies in the 
study. Contrary to a naive opinion, this deviation does not fade over time; for some technologies, 
it even increases over time. The main cause for deviation is also not the sponsor of the review 
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(public policy observers and the media sometimes suspect the pharmaceutical industry of 
overstating drug efficacy), as sponsorship effects fade when one accounts for different study 
designs. The deviation among reviews affects sales, beyond the effect of mean performance. Our 
findings provide a clear motivation for technology evolution scholars to extend their inquiry 
beyond a single source for performance measurement. 
The next section presents the conceptual background on technology evolution. Then we 
discuss our data gathering procedures and measures, after which we turn to our findings. We end 
with a discussion of our findings, the study‟s limitations, and implications of our research.  
Conceptual Background: Technology Evolution 
Technology evolution scholars plot the performance of a technology over time. The 
metric they use to operationalize technology performance is the cumulative maximum 
performance at any given period, or in other words the performance of the historically best-
performing product over time (Christensen 1997; Foster 1986; Sood and Tellis 2005). They 
motivate the use of this metric with three different arguments.  
First, the theoretical inferences they intend to draw are on the frontier of technical 
performance, which supports the use of a cumulative measure (Dosi 1982; Foster 1986). Second, 
their subsequent interest in competition among technologies, explains their mapping only the 
best performance of each technology (Christensen 1997; Foster 1986). Third, they use 
manufacturer-stated performance, as they consider technology performance to be objectively 
quantifiable and propose the use of this method for developing a technology strategy (Foster 
1986).  
These arguments can be challenged, especially if one adopts a marketing perspective, 
which is often done in this literature as it explains competition (Christensen 1997, Foster 1986) 
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or demand (Utterback 1994). Technology evolution literature ignores that firms that shift the 
technology frontier may at a later stage withdraw the product that created the shift in the frontier 
from the market or that later information shows that the performance was overstated or 
erroneously measured. In such situations, one would expect technology performance to be 
downgraded, which does not happen with the cumulative maximum metric these scholars adhere 
to. Withdrawals are common, unfortunately, in many markets. Think of recent laptop recalls (e.g. 
by Dell, HP, and Sony) because of overheating batteries or withdrawals of pharmaceutical drugs 
(such as Vioxx). Obviously, products that shift the technology frontier are at a higher risk of 
withdrawal as they are at the frontier of present knowledge. Overstated performance is also quite 
common, unfortunately. When such overstatement is blatant, regulators may force manufacturers 
to restate their performance levels. Forced manufacturer restatements on performance are 
common in the car industry, on performance dimensions such as safety or mileage (Bates et al 
2007; Yelkur et al 2001). 
We can also challenge the notion that technology performance is objectively quantifiable 
(Mitra and Golder 2006). Critics, independent reviewers, or independent researchers may all 
come to different conclusions on the performance of the technology than manufacturers, and 
manufacturers may disagree among themselves. Thus, substantial variance may exist around the 
mean perceived performance of the technology, and this deviation would not necessarily be 
stable over time. That performance is not easily quantifiable and can differ among sources, can 
be witnessed in the electronics industry (e.g. Mossberg‟s reviews in the Wall Street Journal may 
differ quite a bit from manufacturer claims), the pharmaceutical industry (where independent 
researchers may even disagree among themselves), and the computer industry (where 
manufacturers may champion different methods of testing product performance). 
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As marketers, we take a strong interest in the consequences of technology evolution for 
demand, as it is the major return on innovation dollars. However, demand may be affected by 
both the level of performance and the deviation among technology reviews. The prevailing 
opinion is that deviation among technology reviews may generate uncertainty, which may, in 
turn, suppress sales as customers defer purchase decisions (Dhar 1997). Hence, it is not only 
important to account for performance improvement but also the deviation associated with 
multiple measurements of performance in estimating the demand.   
The study of technology evolution by its cumulative maximum performance over time 
has led scholars to conclusions and generalizations on: (1) the shape of technology evolution, (2) 
the impact of technology evolution on sales, and (3) the impact of technological superiority on 
market dominance. 
The shape of technology evolution (see Figure 1) has been claimed to be S-curve (Dosi 
1982; Foster 1986; Sahal 1981; Tushman and Nelson 1990; Utterback 1994), exponential 
(Edwards 2008; Moore 1997), linear (Christensen 1997) and step function (Sood and Tellis 
2005). Proponents of technology evolution in the shape of S-curves suggest that the performance 
of any technology is low for an initial period after its introduction until technological bottlenecks 
are resolved. The performance later improves much faster as the technology enters a growth 
phase. Eventually the technology enters a mature phase when improvements in product 
performance are small and infrequent (see Figure 1a).  
“Insert Figure 1 about here” 
Proponents of technological evolution in the shape of an exponential curve suggest that 
the performance of a technology improves at a constant rate (see Figure 1b). This empirical 
generalization has been observed across a number of technologies including semiconductors, 
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biotechnology, nanotechnology, and genomics (Edwards 2008; Moore 2003). Other researchers 
(e.g. Christensen 1997) theorize technological evolution as a straight line with performance of 
the technology improving linearly over time (see Figure 1c). Sood and Tellis (2005) theorize the 
shape of technological evolution as a series of steps with periods of stagnant performance 
punctuated with jumps in performance (see Figure 1d). Thus, scholars in the technology 
evolution literature differ in their conceptualization of the shape of technology evolution curve 
over time. Moreover, since all these reviews use the cumulative maximum performance as the 
metric, technological evolution is, by design, monotonically increasing. 
Likewise, prior findings on the impact of technology evolution on sales are mixed. Some 
researchers claim that sales increase as technologies improve in performance as better products 
target larger markets and enable new applications (Golder and Tellis 1997; Rogers 1995). Other 
researchers claim that sales may drop or remain stagnant even as technologies improve in 
performance as better products move further from the demands of the mass market (i.e., 
overshoot) and become more expensive (Adner and Levinthal 2002; Christensen 1997).  
 Prior researchers also make inferences on the effect of technological superiority on 
market dominance (Anderson and Tushman 1990; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Suarez 2004). All 
factors equal, technological superiority should increase the likelihood of market dominance. 
Opponents of this logic have argued that the best product does not always enjoy market 
dominance and referred to examples such as the VHS recording technology or the QWERTY 
keyboard (Christensen 1997; Rosenbloom and Cusumano 1987). Tellis, Yin and Niraj (2009) 
have convincingly invalidated this opposing logic and shown that high quality products always 
win over the long term.  
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Data 
We first present the institutional context of the present paper. Then, we discuss the data 
sources and the data gathering procedure we used.  
Institutional Context: Statins 
Statins (HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors; ATC: C10aa) influence the rate-limiting enzyme 
in cholesterol synthesis and, thereby, lower excessive cholesterol levels in the blood, particularly 
low density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol. Reviews show that, to a minor extent, they may also 
increase high density lipoprotein (HDL) cholesterol and decrease excessive triglyceride levels, 
while expert interviews with physicians revealed in practice they do not observe such effects 
from statin intake. To achieve HDL increase and triglyceride decrease, physicians use other 
platform technologies, such as Omega-3 fatty acids or niacin for HDL and, fibrates or niacin for 
triglycerides, possibly in combination with a statin (for LDL reduction). For this reason, this 
paper will focus on LDL reduction as the primary technology dimension
1
. LDL reduction is 
expressed as the level of LDL in patients at the end of a clinical review over the LDL in those 
same patients at the start of the clinical review.  
Cholesterol can cause the buildup of plaque on the inside walls of arteries. Plaques can 
grow large enough to significantly reduce the blood's flow through an artery. But most of the 
damage occurs when plaques become fragile and rupture. Plaques that rupture cause blood clots 
to form that can block blood flow. If such clots block a blood vessel that feeds the heart, a heart 
attack may occur. If it blocks a blood vessel that feeds the brain, a stroke may occur. And if 
                                                 
1
 We acknowledge recent reviews (e.g. Liao and Laufs 2005) that show so-called pleiotropic effects of statins 
beyond LDL reduction (i.e., anti-inflammatory properties).  
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blood supply to the arms or legs is reduced, it can cause difficulty walking and eventually 
gangrene or issue death.  
Dr Akira Endo and Dr Masao Kuroda of Tokyo commenced research on statins in 1971 
(Endo 1992). Merck & Co. successfully isolated the chemical Lovastatin and commercially 
introduced it as the first statin under the name Mevacor in 1987. Over time, new statin treatments 
entered the market as well: Pravastatin (by BMS and marketed under the name Pravachol), 
Simvastatin (also by Merck and marketed under the name Zocor), Fluvastatin (by Novartis and 
marketed under the name Lescol), Cerivastatin (also by Pfizer and marketed under the name 
Baycol), Atorvastatin (by Pfizer and marketed under the name Lipitor), and Rosuvastatin (by 
AstraZeneca and marketed under the name Crestor).
2
  
While these technologies have certain commonalities – i.e. focus on the same biological 
process in the human body, i.e. lowering LDL cholesterol, and to a minor extent, increasing HDL 
cholesterol and lowering triglycerides – they are different technologies as they are based upon 
different chemical compositions. For instance, Lovastatin is a natural product. Pravastatin is 
derived from compactin by biotransformation. Simvastatin is a semisynthetic derivative of 
Lovastatin. Atorvastatin, Cerivastatin, Fluvastatin, and Rosuvastatin are all fully synthetic 
products. 
Each statin technology also improves incrementally, because of changes in dosage and 
administration. Firms continue to conduct considerable research and development activities 
related to lipid lowering mechanisms and the need for greater reductions in LDL cholesterol 
continues to drive the development of higher doses of currently approved and marketed lipid 
                                                 
2
 Recently, reviews have also cited red yeast rice as a purely natural statin. The substance has been used in the East 
for many hundreds of years and its usage, based on casual observation, is also increasing in the U.S. and all around 
the world. Precise data is unavailable, because red yeast rice is sold both as a drug and as dietary supplement, in 
various formulations.  
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lowering drugs, combination drugs between existing compounds, different administration 
methods and the development of new, more effective compounds, or variations of compounds 
(see Appendix A for details on performance reviews).  
Data Gathering Procedures 
The data we gathered for this study is drug performance reported in clinical reviews at 
various stages of its development and commercialization, by both manufacturers and 
independent researchers, from the category‟s inception in 1982 till 2007. We use the 
internationally accepted World Health Organization (WHO)‟s Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical 
(ATC) Classification System to identify the different technologies. The WHO‟s ATC system is 
probably the most widely used technology classification system. The drugs are divided into 
different groups according to the organ or system on which they act on, and their chemical, 
pharmacological and therapeutic properties. 
ATC classifies drugs in groups at five different levels – anatomical main groups, e.g. 
Cardiovascular System (1
st
 level), therapeutic subgroups, e.g. combinations of lipid modifying 
agents (2
nd
 level), pharmacological subgroups, e.g. plain lipid modifying agents (3
rd
 level), 
chemical subgroup, e.g. HMG CoA reductase inhibitors or statins (4
th
 level), and the chemical 
substance, e.g. Simvastatin (5
th
 level). 
We bound our inquiry to the 4
th
 level to include all drugs in the HMG CoA reductase 
inhibitors category, also known as the C10aa class. Thus, we limit the analyses to drugs with 
only one active ingredient and exclude reviews that evaluate combinations of drugs/technologies 
(i.e., drugs with multiple active ingredients, such as a drug that includes both a statin and a 
fibrate). In our data window, it consists of the following therapeutic technologies (approval dates 
in parenthesis): Lovastatin (1987), Pravastatin (1991), Simvastatin (1991), Fluvastatin (1993), 
 12 
Atorvastatin (1996), Cerivastatin (1997), and Rosuvastatin (2003). Pitavastatin is not approved 
by the FDA yet and thus, as of yet, not available commercially. Thus we inventory all the 
technologies within a class of chemical subgroup (statins) that all inhibit the enzyme HMG-CoA 
reductase and thereby reduce low density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol.  
To inventory all clinical reviews on the above technologies, we use electronic 
bibliographic databases, such as Medline, EMBASE, the Cochrane Database of Systematic 
Reviews (CDSR), the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CCTR), the Database of 
Abstracts of Reviews of Effects (DARE), the Science Citation Index, the NHS Economic 
Evaluation Database (NHS EED), and the Health Technology Assessment Database (NHS 
HTA). We also searched in all medical journals that belonged to the top 25 percentile (62 
journals in total) of the population of all medical journals that belonged to the following four 
International Survey Industries (ISI) categories: cardiac and cardiovascular systems, critical care 
medicine, internal medicine, and peripheral vascular disease. Within these 62 journals, a search 
for all articles that covered at least one statin yielded a total of 663 technology reviews. From 
these 663 reviews, we identified a total of 171 reviews that gave specific and empirical 
performance measures (e.g. the reduction in LDL cholesterol levels they empirically recovered). 
We include both clinical reviews and meta-analysis reviews in the sample, and refer to both as 
technology reviews henceforth. We excluded two types of reviews: (1) reviews that did not 
provide the performance of the drug versus a placebo, as we will use this placebo comparison as 
a base level to measure performance; (2) reviews of multi-interventional therapies (e.g. statins 
and fibrates) where the independent effect of the drug could not be separated out from the 
combined effect. We extracted a total of 474 unique drug-dosage combinations from these 
reviews.  
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We use two reviewers to extract the data using a standardized form that inventoried: 
source of funding, duration of the clinical review, dosage during the clinical review, the number 
of patients involved, and the standing of the journal that the review is published in. A random 
sample of reviews was coded by both reviewers independently, to check for consensus. We also 
obtained quarterly data on sales and detailing in the U.S. for each drug, from IMS Health, from 
1997 to 2006.  
Findings 
In this section, we examine the extent to which deviation among technology reviews 
exists (over time). Then, we investigate the origin of deviation among reviews and whether 
deviation affects the sales of different technologies. 
Deviation among Technology Reviews 
We examine deviation among technology reviews through the hetereogeneity in the LDL 
reduction reported among clinical reviews. As an example, Figure 2a shows the frequency 
distribution of LDL reduction of Atorvastatin, the top selling drug, among all reviews that 
evaluated its performance. Interestingly, the variation one finds among reviews is huge, from 8% 
to 64% LDL reduction with a mean around 40% LDL reduction. Other statins demonstrate a 
similar deviation among reviews. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of LDL reduction 
reported among reviews for all statins.  
“Insert Table 1 about here” 
Is this deviation among reviews stable over time? On the one hand, one may expect more 
recent reviews to show less deviation on the efficacy of a technology. Over time, scientists and 
physicians acquire better knowledge on the most appropriate use of the technology (e.g. in this 
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case, dosage and method of administration of drug) (Piantadosi 2005). On the other hand, once 
successfully tailored to a certain patient body, the technology may be engineered towards 
different patient types, who may show a very different response to the technology (Ioannidis and 
Lau 2001). Or, increasingly positive reviews by the manufacturer could provoke increasingly 
negative reviews by competitors or independent reviewers. Figure 2b shows the LDL reduction 
of Atorvastatin each review reports in the respective time frame, year-by-year. In the case of 
Atorvastatin, the deviation does not fade over time. Rather, the deviation among reviews seems 
to persist over time.  
“Insert Figure 2 about here” 
We next examine the deviation in performance among reviews measured as the standard 
deviation among all reviews published each year for each statin in our sample over time (see 
Figure 3). The figure shows that the deviation is higher for some technologies (e.g. Atorvastatin) 
than other technologies (e.g. Simvastatin). The deviation decreases over time for some 
technologies (e.g. Pravastatin) and increases over time for other technologies (e.g. Simvastatin). 
“Insert Figure 3 about here” 
The Origin of Deviation among Technology Reviews 
Where does deviation among technology reviews originate, specifically in the case of 
medical technologies? As illustrated above, there is a strong belief that manufacturers have an 
incentive to overstate the performance of their own technology (Sismondo 2008). At the same 
time, while clinical reviews on medical technologies are designed to provide an unbiased 
estimate of the performance of a particular treatment, deviation among technology reviews may 
be driven by systematic differences in study design (Rosenberger and Lachin 2002). Medical 
literature suggests that the following study design factors may affect results on effectiveness: the 
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duration of the review, the dosage that is administered, the number of patients in the review, 
source of funding, and the standing of journal (Meinert 1986; Piantadosi 2005). We also include 
the duration between the review and FDA approval of the drug as an additional variable to test 
for differences in measured performance over time. 
To examine how the above elements of study design affect the results on technology 
performance, we model the relationship between the performance of technology d, in review r, 
published in year t and study design characteristics as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 t 
(1)    
                        
drt drt drt drt drt
drt drt dr
PERF DURATION DOSAGE NUMBER STANDING
FUNDING TIMESINCEAPPROVAL
    
  
     
   
 where  
drtPERF  
: Performance (% LDL reduction) of technology d reported in review r at 
time t;  
drtDURATION : Duration of review r (weeks) for technology d at time t;  
drtDOSAGE  
: Dosage (mg/day) of technology d in review r (mg/day) at time t;  
drtNUMBER  
: Number of patients in review r on technology d at time t; 
drtSTANDING  
: Impact factor of the journal in which review r on technology d at time t 
review was published; 
drtFUNDING  
: Dummy variable for source of funding (which is 1 if the manufacturer 
funded the review r on technology d at time t and 0 otherwise). 
drtTIMESINCEAPPROVAL  
: Duration between review r and FDA approval of technology d 
ε is normally distributed error with 2E( ) 0 and Var( )      .  
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Equation 1 is estimated with OLS (Ordinary Least Squares). Table 2 shows the results. 
The model fit is reasonable, given the few independent variables used to explain a complex 
phenomenon (Adjusted R-squared=.33). The coefficients suggest that reviews of long duration 
report lower performance than reviews of short duration (t=-5.1). There are at least two reasons 
why this may occur. First, reviews of long duration occur in later phase of the drug approval 
process and contain patients with a larger variation in the (severity of the) condition they suffer 
from. The technology may be found to be less effective in patient types for which the drug is not 
ideally suited, lowering the average performance that is reported. Second, reviews of long 
duration suffer from lower patient adherence than reviews of short duration (Haynes and Haines 
1998; Rutherford, Sneed, and Roose 2009). A drug‟s performance is typically lower in patients 
that do not strictly adhere to therapy than in patients that strictly adhere to therapy.  
“Insert Table 2 about here” 
Reviews in which higher dosages are administered to patients show a higher performance 
than reviews in which low dosages are administered to patients (t=5.4). Our results are in line 
with earlier findings that report an increase in performance with an increase in the dosage within 
the broad range of dosages tested among reviews (Aschenbrenner and Venable 2008).  
We also find that reviews with few patients do not differ in performance with reviews 
with larger number of patients (t=.5). Increasing sample size does not translate to a proportionate 
increase in performance as the sample size of clinical reviews is determined based on careful 
calculations and estimates of performance stabilize at modest sample sizes. Subsequent increases 
in sample size serve mainly to increase the power of the test and not the level of performance 
(Piantadosi 2005).  
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Our results suggest that performance reported in reviews does not depend upon the 
standing of the journal in which the review appeared (t=1.1). Even though journals of higher 
standing are more critical of study design factors (e.g. control variables) (McCarthy 2000; 
Nathan and Weatherall 1999; Rennie 1996), poor design may lead to both overstating and 
understating the effect in journals of lower standing (Gluud et al 2005; Kjaergard and Als-
Nielsen 2002; Moher et al 1998; Schulz et al 1995). Our sample also excludes journals of low 
standing, which may be another reason why we find no differences across journal outlets with 
different standards. 
Reviews may be more likely to favor the technology of the funder, if he has a commercial 
interest in it (Bodenheimer 2000; Lexchin et al 2003). First, manufacturers may choose to fund 
projects with a higher likelihood of positive results. Second, the manufacturer may choose to 
stop clinical reviews before completion if initial results on drug performance are disappointing. 
Contrary to these reasons and to common belief, we find that the source of funding has no effect 
on the measured performance of the technology once one controls for study design (t=-.2).  
Finally, the results suggest that earlier reviews report higher performance than later 
reviews (t=-9.2), probably because earlier reviews are targeted towards patients with a more 
severe indication or ideally suited body type, who, hence, show a stronger response to the new 
drug, as compared to reviews among larger samples. Later reviews possibly target patient 
profiles which are expected to respond less to the treatment (see Appendix A). 
Effects of Deviation Among Technology Reviews on Sales  
Next, we examine the effects of performance deviation among reviews on sales. We 
control for a firm´s marketing efforts through its detailing, which is likely to be endogenous with 
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sales. Therefore, we estimate a SUR (Seemingly Unrelated Regression) model of sales of 
technology d in quarter q and detailing for technology d in quarter q, as follows:
 
1 1
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9  
(2)  ALES dqdq dq q q d dq dq
dq dq d d dq
S PERF DEVIATION SIMG CERW DETAILING SALES
TIME CSALES TECHNOLOGY
      
   
 

       
  
 
1 1
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9  
(3)  ETAILING dqdq dq q q d dq dq
dq dq d d dq
D PERF DEVIATION SIMG CERW DETAILING SALES
TIME CDETAILING TECHNOLOGY
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Where,  
dqSALES  Sales (in thousands of kg) of technology d in quarter q; 
dqPERF  Mean performance (% LDL reduction) among all reviews for technology d 
in quarter q; 
dqDEVIATION  Deviation on performance, measured as the standard deviation among all 
reviews for technology d in quarter q;  
qSIMG  Dummy variable for launch of generic Simvastatin (=1 as of launch); 
qCERW  Dummy variable for withdrawal of Cerivastatin (=1 as of time of 
withdrawal); 
1dq
DETAILING  Lagged detailing expenditure of technology d in quarter q-1; 
dqTIME  Time (quarters) since launch of technology d in quarter q; 
1dq
CSALES  Total lagged sales („000 kg) of other technologies in the same ATC code 
excluding technology d in quarter q-1; 
1dq
CDETAILING  Total lagged detailing expenditure of other technologies in the same ATC 
code excluding technologies excluding technology d in quarter q-1; 
dTECHNOLOGY  Vector of dummies for each technology d; 
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β and λ are parameters to be estimated, and ω and υ are normally distributed errors, 
allowed to be correlated between equations, with  ), E(and 0) E(,0)E( ' TI  .  
As independent variables, we include both mean performance and deviation around that 
mean performance, as these are focal to our inquiry, across the different study designs that 
characterize the technology reviews in our sample. We also control for two events that may have 
shaken the total sales in the category and the respective technologies, namely the introduction of 
generic Simvastatin and the withdrawal of Cerivastatin. To control for other technology-level 
effects that are fixed over time, we include fixed technology effects. We also control for lagged, 
technology-specific, detailing (in line with prior literature, e.g. Venkataraman and Stremersch 
2007), lagged sales (to model contagion and inertia in the sales equation and volume 
considerations in detailing decisions), time (to control for duration dependence), and competitive 
sales (in Equation 2) and detailing (in Equation 3) (to control for the impact of competitive 
effects and behavior on own sales and own detailing decisions). 
The model fit and coefficient estimates of the SUR model in Equations 2 and 3 are in 
Table 3. The model fit is satisfactory (adjusted R-squared for the sales model = .92; adjusted R-
squared for the detailing model = .90; system weighted R-squared = .94).  
“Insert Table 3 about here” 
Consistent with prior findings and naive intuition, we find that improvements in mean 
performance of the technology enhance the overall sales of a technology (t=2.2). More novel is 
the finding that an increase in the deviation among reviews also has a positive effect on sales 
(t=2.2). Consequently, we find that deviation across reviews does not necessarily enhance 
uncertainty and suppress sales, as commonly believed. Rather, as more reviews are conducted on 
different patient profiles, physicians and customers may receive more information on the full 
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contingencies of performance of the technology thereby actually reducing, rather than enhancing, 
their uncertainty. Such full information on contingencies may positively affect sales.  
As to the other variables we control for, we find that the introduction of the generic 
version of Simvastatin affected the sales of Simvastatin positively (t=4.4), most likely because 
the generic variant of the technology was sold at a much lower price than the branded variant. 
The withdrawal of Cerivastatin had a negative, but insignificant effect on sales of Cerivastatin 
(t=-.5). The reason was that Cerivastatin sales were never high and already very low before it 
was formally withdrawn. In line with recent findings about heterogeneity of detailing effects 
(Leeflang, Wieringa, and Wittink 2004; Narayanan and Manchanda 2009; Venkatraman and 
Stremersch 2007), our results show that only some drugs – Atorvastatin (t=3.8), Pravastatin 
(t=4.3), and Fluvastatin (t=9.7) benefit from detailing, while other drugs including Lovastatin 
(t=-1.9), Simvastatin (t=-2.2) and Rosuvastatin (t=.9) show small or even negative effects of 
detailing. As expected, a higher level of lagged sales results in higher sales (t=4.4) and sales of 
statins show an increase in sales over time (t=8.8). Competitor sales has no effect on sales (t=.3). 
Table 3 also presents the effects of the detailing equation (Equation 3). Increases in mean 
performance or in deviation of performance do not lead to significant changes in detailing. We 
find a negative relationship between introduction of generic Simvastatin and detailing 
expenditures (t=-2.0), because branded firms reduce the detailing of the branded drug after patent 
expiration and the manufacturer of the generic version rarely details. The coefficient of the 
withdrawal of Cerivastatin is also negative (t=-2.0), as the manufacturer withdraws all detailing 
support if the drug is withdrawn from the market. All drugs show a positive effect of both lagged 
detailing expenditures (t>1.96) and of lagged sales (t=2.1). None of the other covariates 
significantly influence detailing, except for the fixed effect of Fluvastatin.  
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As a robustness check, we also ran the same models (Equation 2 and 3) with maximum 
performance (as is common in technology evolution literature) and the results were not 
materially different from those reported here. 
Discussion 
Technology evolution literature uses a single metric, the cumulative maximum 
performance stated by the manufacturer, to make inference on the typical pattern of technology 
evolution and analyze competition among technologies. The present paper uncovers that 
substantial deviation may exist on a technology‟s performance among technology reviews. 
Deviation between technology reviews on a technology‟s performance may be grounded 
in different review duration (i.e., longer reviews may show lower performance), different dosage 
(i.e., reviews that administer a higher dosage of a drug find the drug to be more effective, than 
reviews that administer a lower dosage), and time since FDA approval (i.e., earlier reviews show 
higher performance of the technology than later reviews). Beyond such design factors, we did 
not find any sponsorship (i.e., manufacturer-based versus independent reviews) or publication 
(i.e. standing of journal) effect. It is easily conceivable that equally large deviation among 
technology reviews exists in other industries as well. For instance, laptop batteries can perform 
differently depending upon the applications a laptop is running and its frequency of usage. In 
fact, this is precisely the reason laptop manufacturers provide a range of battery life and why 
many laptop users have grown accustomed to widen that range even further, when they think 
about battery life. 
We also found that this substantial deviation, surprisingly, persists over time. One would 
typically assume that as time progresses and one learns to use a technology to its largest 
effectiveness (Coscelli and Shum 2004), deviation among reviews about its performance would 
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fade. In the case of medicine, doctors may learn to adjust dosage, treatment duration and 
administration or adjust technology choice to patient types. Personalization technologies, search 
engines, virus protection and voice recognition software may get better as more consumers 
inform and use them. However, new technology reviews may design the study differently, in 
consequence showing higher or lower performance than previously believed.  
The prime implication of our study is that if substantial deviation on technology 
performance exists, it may be misleading to infer technological superiority – the frontier of 
technology evolution – solely based on manufacturers‟ claims. Figure 4a displays technology 
evolution, based on the cumulative maximum performance as stated by the manufacturer, while 
Figure 4b displays technology evolution, based on the cumulative maximum performance as 
stated by independent reviewers. On the basis of manufacturer-sponsored reviews, the best 
performing statin technology is initially Lovastatin (Merck), then Simvastatin (Merck), after 
which Atorvastatin (Pfizer), and Rosuvastatin (Astrazeneca) were the superior technologies (see 
Figure 4a). However, on the basis of independent reviews, Lovastatin and Rosuvastatin were the 
superior technologies in the successive periods (see Figure 4b). The divergence on a 
technology‟s performance between different sources can be very large. Atorvastatin is probably 
the best example. While independent reviews rate its performance around 45 to 55% LDL 
reduction, manufacturer-sponsored reviews rate its performance around 65% reduction as of the 
end of the „90s (see Figure 4b). We have shown such deviation between manufacturer-sponsored 
and independent reviews to fade once one accounts for study design. Thus, these differences 
partially confirm, but also partially disconfirm, the prevalent concerns in the medical literature 
about industrial funding of clinical reviews (Cho and Bero 1996; Davidson 1986; Kelly et al 
2006; Lexchin et al 2003; Stelfox et al 1998). 
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“Insert Figure 4 about here” 
Also theoretical inference on the shape of technological evolution may be misguided, by 
basing it solely on the cumulative maximum performance reported in manufacturer-sponsored 
reviews. In line with findings of Sood and Tellis (2005), the plots in Figure 4 support the pattern 
of technological evolution as a step function (as per Figure 1d), rather than S-shaped (Figure 1a), 
exponential (Figure 1b), or linear (Figure 1c). We also observe, consistent with Sood and Tellis 
(2005), but inconsistent with Foster (1986) that technologies enter both below and above the 
incumbent technologies. While Rosuvastatin enters above the prevailing incumbent 
(Atorvastatin), according to manufacturer-sponsored reviews, it enters below Atorvastatin, 
according to independent reviews.  
Traditional wisdom on technology evolution suggests that technologies evolve along 
monotonically increasing curves over time. On the contrary, new information may contradict 
prior claims of high performance and lead to reduction in observed performance over time. This 
raises questions regarding the underlying phenomenon of technology evolution when deviation 
on performance is also accounted for when plotting the path of technological evolution. We also 
plotted the moving averages of performance reported over all reviews, both manufacturer-
sponsored and independent (see Figure 5). The plots suggest that the prior generalization of 
technology evolution literature that technology evolution is monotonically increasing is valid 
only when we use the cumulative maximum as the metric. However, when we use mean 
performance as the metric, many technologies (e.g. Lovastatin and Atorvastatin) demonstrate 
different outcomes as later reviews deviate from prior reviews. Future research is required on 
better methods to depict technological evolution. 
“Insert Figure 5 about here” 
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In sum, our findings suggest future avenues for research into deviation among technology 
reviews as a way to enrich technology evolution theory. However, there are also clear managerial 
implications from our work.  
Some of the findings in our study may greatly concern public policy makers. First, we 
find that manufacturer-sponsored reviews show on the average higher performance than 
independent reviews (contrast Figure 4a and 4b), not by overstating performance, but by clever 
design in duration and dosage (see Table 2). Second, the reported performance declines with 
time from date of FDA approval suggesting ingenious study design may hide true performance 
till additional reviews provide more reliable and complete information over time to physicians. 
Instances in which independent reviews report performance higher than the one reported by the 
manufacturer are comparatively rare. An example is Saito et al (2003), a review sponsored by 
Graduate School of Medicine, Chiba University to test the efficacy of Rosuvastatin on Japanese 
patients with hypercholesterolemia, which reported LDL reductions of 66% at a time when 
reviews managed by Astra Zeneca had reported a reduction of only 64%. Moreover, sales are 
favorably associated with more favorable reviews in two ways. As reviews with higher 
performance are published, the mean performance increases and as such reviews deviate from 
previously published independent reviews with lower performance, the observed deviation 
between reviews increases. Both a higher mean performance and higher deviation are associated 
with higher sales.  
Prior research in marketing investigating the effects of detailing has typically abstracted 
away from scientific evidence. Our sales model reveals that sales respond to not only clinical 
evidence – as operationalized by mean performance and deviation on performance – but also to 
detailing, even when controlling for clinical evidence, supporting earlier findings by Azoulay 
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(2002). Some public policy makers may be of the opinion that only scientific evidence should 
matter in which drugs are prescribed to patients. 
Managers trade off allocating moneys to technology reviews and direct-to-physician 
marketing efforts. In fact, a clinical review is one way of reaching physicians, while detailing is 
another. Clinical reviews are often also incorporated in sales conversations. An important 
implication of our work for managers is to counter disappointing technology reviews from 
independent reviewers by their own reviews, designed to yield more favorable outcomes. The 
present study shows that even though diverse reviews may create higher deviation, they lead to a 
fuller understanding of the technology‟s performance under different conditions by physicians 
thereby expanding total sales. This result provides a clear call for more evidence-based 
management at pharmaceutical firms. 
Limitations  
This study has several limitations. First we had to limit our analysis to only one category 
due to the time-consuming nature and difficulty of data collection. Data collection for the current 
sample took over a year of work of the first author. We also only collected data within one 
industry, namely the life sciences industry. Prior research has supported the relevance of this 
industry and clarified its specificity (Stremersch and Van Dyck 2009). Future research that 
enriches technology evolution theory with deviation among technology reviews in a different 
industry would be very fruitful. Industries one may consider in such study are the automobile 
industry (mileage) and the PC industry (battery life), among others. 
Second, we limit the analyses to publications in the top 25 percentile of academic 
journals only. This limitation introduces a sample selection issue, which we conceive as minor, 
as our premise is that physicians are especially influenced by reviews that appear in the top 
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quartile of medical journals and to a much lesser extent by reviews that appear in lower tier 
journals. The publication of reviews is often supported by medical journal advertising. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on medical journal advertising for the drugs in the period we 
study. 
More broadly, this study is an open invitation to other scholars that investigate 
technology evolution to develop a better metric for technology evolution that accounts for the 
presence of deviation among technology reviews. In our mind, when such deviation exists, mean 
performance and the standard deviation in technology performance among reviews should be the 
metric of choice. However, we stopped short on formalizing this and contrasting these measures 
to other alternate measures, nor did we derive conditions for which metric to use and when. 
Future research is required on better methods to depict technological evolution. 
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Table 1: 
Deviation on LDL Reduction Among All Statins and All Reviews 
Included in our Analysis 
 
Drug 
Mean 
Reduction in 
LDL Among 
All Reviews 
Minimum 
Reduction in 
LDL Among 
All Reviews 
Maximum 
Reduction in 
LDL Among 
All Reviews 
Std. 
Deviation of 
Reduction in 
LDL Among 
All Reviews  
Lovastatin  33.0% 17.0% 48.0% 7.1 
Pravastatin 26.6% 15.7% 50.8% 5.0 
Simvastatin 37.1% 15.5% 53.0% 6.1 
Atorvastatin 40.5% 6.3% 64.0% 9.9 
Fluvastatin 26.5% 15.0% 36.1% 4.8 
Cerivastatin 31.4% 11.5% 44.0% 8.5 
Rosuvastatin 46.7% 28.0% 70.0% 8.7 
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Table 2: 
The Origin of Deviation Among Technology Reviews:  
Impact of Study Design Characteristics on Performance Reported 
  
Variable Estimate T-value 
Intercept 41.4 17.6 
Duration of Review (weeks) -2.9 -5.1 
Dosage (mg/day) 2.0 5.4 
Number of Patients .2 .5 
Standing of Journal (Impact Factor) .1 1.1 
Source of Funding (= 1 if funded by 
manufacturer) 
-.3 -.2 
Time since FDA Approval (Years) -.9 -9.2 
Adjusted R-Squared .33 
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Table 3: 
Impact of Technology Evolution on Sales and Detailing 
Variable 
Sales Detailing 
Estimate 
T-
value Estimate 
T-
value 
 
Intercept -19557.6 -9.8 15640.6 1.2 
Distribution of 
Performance 
Mean Performance 30.5 2.2 -20.0 -.8 
Deviation on Performance 27.1 2.2 40.6 .9 
Control: 
External Shocks 
Introduction of Generic Simvastatin 1739.6 4.4 -1561.7 -2.0 
Withdrawal of Cerivastatin -225.7 -.5 -1716.0 -2.0 
Control:  
Self Detailing 
Effects 
(Lagged) 
Lag (Atorvastatin Detailing) .3 3.8 .8 5.3 
Lag (Lovastatin Detailing) -.2 -1.9 .9 5.1 
Lag(Pravastatin Detailing) .3 4.3 .9 7.6 
Lag (Rosuvastatin Detailing) .1 .9 .5 4.8 
Lag (Simvastatin Detailing) -.1 -2.2 .9 13.6 
Lag (Fluvastatin Detailing) .4 9.7 .9 10.7 
Control 
Lag (Sales) 351.6 4.4 348.9 2.1 
Time 78.0 8.8 -49.2 -.8 
Control: 
Competition 
Lag (Competition Detailing) - - .1 .6 
Lag (Competitor Sales) .2 .3 - - 
Control:  
Technology  
effects 
Atorvastatin 3971.4 4.0 -10512.6 -1.8 
Lovastatin 15825.3 7.5 -17681.5 -1.2 
Pravastatin 12085.3 7.3 -15520.8 -1.4 
Rosuvastatin -4198.8 -3.5 1948.8 0.8 
Simvastatin 12271.4 8.1 -12281.6 -1.4 
Fluvastatin 3855.6 4.0 -8254.0 -2.5 
Adjusted R-Squared .92 .91 
System Weighted R-Squared .93 
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Figure 1:  
Different Paths of Technological Evolution* 
Figure 1a: S-Shape Figure 1b: Exponential Shape 
  
Figure 1c: Linear Shape Figure 1d: Step functions 
  
Note: * - All paths are based on the same metric (cumulative maximum performance) 
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Figure 2a: 
Range of LDL Reduction among Reviews of Atorvastatin  
 
 
Figure 2b: 
Deviation on Atorvastatin for LDL Reduction over Time 
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Figure 3:  
Evolution of Deviation over Time 
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Figure 4a:  
Technology Evolution of Cumulative Maximum Performance  
(All Drugs; Only Manufacturer-sponsored Reviews) 
 
 
 
Figure 4b:  
Technology Evolution of Cumulative Maximum Performance 
(All Drugs; Only Independent Reviews) 
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Figure 5:  
Technology Evolution of Mean Performance 
(All Drugs; Mean Performance reported among All Reviews)  
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Appendix A: 
Performance Reviews of Medical Technologies 
In the pharmaceutical industry, accurate measurement of the performance of any new 
drug approval is an intrinsic and important part of the new product development process. There 
is an extensive regulation process, overseen by the FDA to ensure that drugs meet the necessary 
levels of performance and safety before commercialization. After an initial new drug filing, the 
new drug is tested first in a pre-clinical stage, which entails in vitro (animal tests) and in silico 
testing (computer simulation). Next, a series of clinical reviews are conducted to test the efficacy 
and safety of the drug. These reviews are commonly classified into four phases. Each phase is 
designed to find different information. Phase I reviews are designed to assess the safety, 
tolerability, process of absorption, distribution, metabolization, and elimination in the body 
(pharmacokinetics), and action and effects on the body (pharmacodynamics). Phase II reviews 
are designed to assess how well the drug works, as well as to continue Phase I safety assessments 
in a larger group of volunteers and patients. Phase III reviews usually compare standard 
treatments (the treatment most accepted) with treatments that appeared to be good in the small 
Phase II reviews. Phase III reviews look for longer life, better quality of life, fewer side effects, 
and fewer cases of the recurrence of the disease. Phase III reviews are randomized controlled 
multicenter reviews on large patient groups. If all reviews report positive results, drugs may be 
approved at the end of Phase III reviews. Phase IV reviews, also known as Post Marketing 
Surveillance reviews, may be required by regulatory authorities or may be undertaken by the 
sponsoring company for competitive (finding a new market for the drug) or additional testing 
(for interactions with other drugs). 
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Performance may be evaluated in terms of potency (amount of drug needed to produce an 
effect), effectiveness (potential maximum therapeutic response), side effects, duration of effect, 
cost or other pre-determined measures. Performance is measured by following two groups of 
patients for a period of time and comparing the two groups on a preselected outcome. In a single 
clinical review, reported performance is the difference in average improvement in patient sample 
receiving the drug and a control sample receiving either a placebo or another drug. 
Thus, irrespective of the number of patients in a review, each review provides only one 
measure of average performance. However, multiple measures of performance may be obtained 
by conducting multiple reviews. In many cases, average performance among multiple clinical 
reviews may be measured through a meta-analysis. Meta-analyses enhance the generalizability of 
results, reduce uncertainty, and increase the overall confidence in the technology for treating the 
particular condition among patients of different backgrounds. 
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